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The Omnipresent Class Action. The class actions represents, without question, 
one of the most ubiquitous topics in modern civil law. It is only a small exaggeration to 
say that virtually every major innovation in liability, if brought about by litigation, will be 
either be created by or reflected in the class action. The reason for the omnipresence of 
class actions lies in their versatility. Class actions are at root an aggregation device for 
separate claims, which are tied, by design, to no substantive theory. They can be used to 
amalgamate large numbers of claims brought by separate individuals, regardless of their 
subject matter. Any lawyer who works with antitrust, corporations, securities, 
discrimination, lending, real property, or torts, will necessarily be familiar with class 
action litigation as a normal part of his or her work. It is hard to describe class actions as 
a distinctive specialty when so many lawyers both pursue and defend these suits on a 
daily basis.  
Nor is it hard to see why class actions have surged to prominence in recent years. 
As litigation becomes ever more complex, the willingness and ability of individual 
plaintiffs to bear its costs is correspondingly diminished. The opportunities for gains, 
however, remain substantial, so the void is quickly filled by entrepreneurial lawyers who 
hope to profit by organizing the class of potential plaintiffs and bringing their joint claim 
to a successful conclusion. The entire process was pushed along by the adoption of the 
1966 Class Action rules, but the reforms, like so many other reforms of the 1960s (and 
other ages) was intended, modestly, to plug the holes that existed in the previous law. The 
strength and weaknesses of the proposed changes were examined in a static sense, in that 
the only question asked was how the previous stock of cases would fare under the new set 
of rules. The usual response is that nettlesome limitations on class actions, or liability 
generally, would be cured so that the system would fall into a new equilibrium that 
knocked out some of the technical impediments to class actions. There is no question that 
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just this result did occur in large number of cases. Sensible suits that could not be brought 
with ease as class actions before 1966 fell easily into that mode after that date. 
The overall analysis, however, is more complex, for this optimistic account of 
legal transitions missed the dynamic element of the process: what new kinds of cases 
would be brought into the system, and how would those be solved under the new set of 
class action rules that were created. To this set of questions, little or no attention was 
paid, either then or now, for it was not possible to foresee with precision the synergistic 
relationship between the changed procedures under class action law, and the great 
expansion of liability of the late 1960s and early 1970s, both by common law and by 
statute. Just to put the point in perspective, the mid-1960s and early 1970s saw the arrival 
of the civil rights statutes, Medicare and Medicaid, the National Highway and Traffic 
Safety Act, OSHA, ERISA, the Endangered Species Act, the Environmental Protection 
Act, all of which have been extensive enough to spawn their own separate specializations 
which in combination account for a huge portion of modern legal practice. This 
legislation also brought into the fold cases that people thought lay outside of it. The rules 
that governed employment discrimination were drafted with an eye to make sure that 
every case of employee termination or transfer did not become the source of a civil rights 
action. The goal was to create a regime in which the admitted cases of overt and 
invidious discrimination could no longer go unpunished. But within several years of its 
passage the statute expanded far beyond the scope its staunchest supporters had 
envisioned. Arguments that certain forms of discrimination were cost-justified (e.g. 
differential employment because women had higher risk rates than men) were rejected 
even though these forms of discrimination count as rational (e.g. cost justified) to the 
economist.1 At the same time, proof of motive and intention yielded to disparate impact 
suits, with an enormous expansion in potential liability. 
Much the same history has taken place with the class action, which was 
introduced as a modest procedural reform in 1966, with the same emphasis of what could 
be done to correct past wrongs. Yet today the dominant pattern everywhere is to push the 
envelop. In 1966 any single collision involving multiple plaintiffs fit only uneasily within 
the new class action rules. Today in contrast, courts will certify class that demand $100 
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billion in damages on behalf of over four million potential class actions, on exotic 
antitrust theories that are controversial to say the least.2 What makes the analysis of this 
area so difficult is that the overall evaluation of these innovations depends ultimately on 
multiple questions of degree, which are often evaluated separately even though they 
operate only in combination. The more generous theories of class actions interact with 
expansions in substantive liability in synergistic effects. 
This simple example shows a real tension between the proper function of a class 
action and its actual application. The theory of class actions is to take a weak signal and 
to amplify it by aggregating small claims that would not otherwise be pursued 
individually, by lowering the cost per individual suit. In practice, many (but by no means 
all) class actions do more than amplify the status quo ante: sometimes they also distort 
the outcomes by imposing liabilities that are, when the transformations of substance and 
procedure are taken into account, far more onerous than a rule of simple multiplication 
will provide. The basic mechanism is to tailor the substantive law in ways that make 
complex individual suits amenable to class action litigation. These changes will almost 
always be in the direction of simplification, which allow for an increase in the number of 
common issues that increase the odds of class certification. But those simplifications also 
make it easier for any individual plaintiff to prevail, resulting in excessive amplification 
of the original claim. The purpose of this paper is to examine the class action on two 
levels. The first is to articulate a general framework of class actions, which should 
facilitate a more detailed examination of class action litigation. This framework may not 
serve to resolve all the knotty questions of class action once the relevant trade-offs are 
identified, but at least it should help us make some sensible first approximations. 
Thereafter I shall give a couple of examples of how amplification can turn into distortion 
in order to explain why this system can go off the rails. 
Accordingly, the first section of this paper outlines in brief compass the general 
approach that I take to this, and indeed all legal matters. In it I try to develop the 
appropriate balance between two imperatives, each accepted as a good in its own right: 
the desire for personal control of each individual claim, and the need for the coordination 
of claims brought in related matters. Thereafter I use these principles to explain the ends 
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to which class actions should be devoted and the mechanisms that might help advance 
their efficient use.  
In dealing with this issue, I begin the discussion with class actions in the context 
of the law of associations. The field is vast and covers the full range of voluntary 
associations, including partnerships, charitable associations and corporations. The main 
field, by no means exclusive field of action lies in the area of corporate law, both through 
derivative suits and direct actions by shareholders. These actions are a special instance of 
cases that may be brought cubbyhole for these suits under Rule 23 (b)(1)(B), as actions 
that “would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not 
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interest.” That mouthful gives the uninitiated little information as to its paradigmatic 
case. But one of the notes to the Federal Rules helps fill that gap. “In an action by policy 
holders against a fraternal benefit association attacking a financial reorganization of the 
society, it would have hardly been practical, if indeed it would have been possible, to 
confine the effects of a validation of the reorganization to the individual plaintiffs.”3 
(Other examples to which I shall refer include the declaration of corporate dividends or 
the handling of various other corporate distributions.)  
These cases are not the locus of the current controversy over class actions, but I 
turn to them first because they illustrate the situations in which class actions, owing to the 
fungible interests of all group members or shareholders, have the greatest utility. The 
purpose of this discussion is to show the formidable difficulties that remain in the 
execution of the class action ideal in the soil most congenial to its growth. Once that 
pattern is accepted, we should be in a position to explore the added complexities when 
class actions are removed from the associational and corporate contexts to cover claims 
brought under, for example, tort, discrimination and antitrust law. The final result here is 
neither to praise nor condemn class actions en masse. Rather it is to develop some clear 
appreciation that the only way to overcome the imperfections of the ordinary rules of 
civil procedure used for the prosecution of individual claims is to invite a different, and 
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sometimes larger, set of imperfections under the class action rubric, including the 
distortion risk alluded to above.  
I: The Basic Trade-Off: Autonomy and Forced Exchanges. A somewhat outdated 
name for civil procedure is adjective law. The substantive law determines the rights and 
duties of ordinary individuals, and thus is the chief concern of any legal system. The 
“adjectival” rules of procedure are sidekicks to the substantive law, because their major 
function is to translate abstract claims into concrete cases whose outcomes comport with 
principles of the substantive law. In dealing with those substantive issues, it is often said 
that the bedrock principle of the common law lies in its respect for individual autonomy 
or self-rule. Each person is said to be the owner of his own body, and can decide when to 
steer clear of certain transactions and when to enter into them. Individual autonomy 
allows ordinary individuals immunity from external aggression; it explains why they are 
allowed to acquire the ownership of property and why they are allowed to sell their labor 
only on terms that they regard as personally satisfactory.  
These abstract entitlements, however, remain inchoate in each person until the 
actions of another violate one of these rights. So to stick only with the simplest case, the 
right to individual autonomy may allow all individuals to have exclusive control over 
their own body, but the content of that right becomes most clear when some other 
individual invades that person by, say, assault and battery. Similarly, individual rights to 
property, are crystallized only when some other person takes away or destroys what they 
own. The right to contract is made vivid only when some other person breaches an 
undertaking to the individual. 
At this point we have to ask this threshold question: who holds the cause of action 
for damage to the person, for loss of property, for breach of contract? Now bedrock 
principles of substantive law start to blend in with the rules of civil procedure. The usual 
“right” answer is that any right of action belongs to that individual whose rights were 
invaded. That proposition seems to apply not only to the traditional common law claims 
just mentioned, but also to other forms of individual claims that apply to the violation of 
other forms of right created under statute. The victims of discrimination are normally 
entitled to sue the perpetrators of that discrimination; the victims of monopoly practices 
normally hold their own claims. 
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My initial question about this outcome is heretical: why? Here it hardly counts as 
a logical contradiction to assert that A’s rights were violated but that the right or action 
for their vindication lies with B. Indeed, if B were an ideal claimant and A were hopeless 
at litigation, then this odd regime would have some real attractiveness not only for the Bs 
of this world, but for the entire system as a whole. The defendant cares not one whit who 
gets his money, but only about the likelihood and magnitude of payment. If deterrence of 
wrongdoing is the dominant goal, then what matters is who pays and how much: it is 
never who collects, or why.4  Let B be the perfect professional plaintiff, then these 
defendants will face higher liabilities, and thus will take greater steps to avoid harm. 
They will know a similar fate that awaits them from violating the rights of other 
individuals. Accordingly, they will refrain from the deliberate invasion of these rights and 
will take care to avoid the accident violation of these rights as well. The greater security 
in the person, in the protection of property, in the performance of contracts is enjoyed not 
by the Bs of the world, but by the As of the world as well. They might be quite pleased to 
be stripped of their rights at all, so long as they believe that their substantive rights will 
be protected by others that bring suit in the event of loss. 
The point of this fairy tale is not to defend the proposition the holders of rights of 
action should not be the people who hold the initial substantive entitlement. It is rather to 
show that no necessary or logical contradiction arises from the simple fact of that 
separation. Putting the matter in this particular fashion thus requires us to think hard 
about the question of who gets the right to sue, and why. It thus forces us to fashion a 
functional explanation for the unity of substantive and remedial rights, which in turn 
leaves open the possibility that this unity may be desirable in most cases, but not in all. 
The conceptual difficulty of this exercise has real payoff in understanding some of the 
peculiar features of class actions. But for the moment I shall defer dealing with that 
question, and ask the simpler point, how do we make a case for the “self-evident” 
proposition that A should have the cause of action for the violation of A’s rights. 
The first point is that it is one thing to contemplate the separation of substantive 
entitlements from rights of action, but quite another thing to determine who has that right 
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or action once that severance is made. Once A and B could be different people, it is 
necessary to posit some rule to decide which B is entitled to the right of action for the 
substantive violation to the rights of each A. How might this be done? Well one 
possibility is to assign the rights arbitrarily, but I don’t think that will commend itself to 
anyone. A has suffered a substantial loss while B gets an undeserved windfall. It looks as 
though we should rather have the damage payment (if such it be) neutralize the loss, 
rather than to give it to someone whose name is drawn out of a hat. Indeed the 
Aristotelian conception of corrective justice,5 which still has widespread support today, 
goes to the opposite extreme: far from random assignment of claims, it treats the 
correction of injustice as critical to the entire legal enterprise. It is absolutely essential 
that the wrongdoer pay the victim, no matter what the abstract rules of deterrence might 
provide. 
Even if (or, after) we reject both random assignment and perfect linkages, we 
might, with an eye to efficiency, think that the right of action for the violation to A could 
be auctioned off by the state, so that the winning bidder may bring the suit, and to keep 
the proceeds of settlement or litigation. After all, auctions are used all the time to sell 
paintings and tulips, so why not causes of action for broken legs and undelivered goods? 
But the language of an auction invites other questions. The auction presumably involves 
some form of payment for the right of action. It therefore becomes necessary to ask, who 
gets the proceeds of the auction? One possibility is to pay A the auction proceeds as 
compensation for the wrong he has suffered. That solution is less than ideal if the 
government has to bear the costs of running the auction, without recovering its overhead 
expenses. Yet if in the end the proceeds go to A, then why not let him conduct the auction 
to begin with? And if he could do that, then why not treat him as owner of the claim who 
may decide to keep the claim, auction it off, or enter into some special risk-sharing 
arrangement, such as a contingent fee contract with a legal specialist. 
But suppose the state decides to run this auction from the center. Certainly A 
should be allowed to bid in order to recover the right to sue on his own behalf. It is likely, 
moreover, that A will be an impressive entry into the bidding wars. Prosecuting any 
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lawsuit for the violation of A’s rights will require the cooperation of A. If liability turns 
on whether X struck A in self-defense, then A’s testimony will be critical to overcoming 
this defense. In general, A’s cooperation is needed for all aspects the case, but once he 
gains nothing from suit, he has no incentive to cooperate with the winning bidder. Other 
individuals will therefore discount their bids by the attendant costs of securing 
cooperation. A does not labor under this disability and therefore should have an inside 
track for the winning bid, at least if he has the resources in question. But of course he 
might not. The lawsuit could have drained him of cash resources, and even our 
sophisticated capital markets do not regard a potential cause of action as 100 percent 
collateral for a loan. (No risk-neutral bank could lend even $10 on an asset worth $1,000 
if that value consists of a 50 percent chance of $2,000 and a 50 percent chance of $0.  
The high variance in payoffs leaves the bank with a huge downside and no participation 
in the upside.)  
The auction rule does not seem to be all that attractive in the abstract. This 
situation does not involve individuals who auction their own property, keeping the 
proceeds for themselves. Rather it is a state device for deciding who gets the right to own 
the cause of action in the first place. Many individuals, most notably Ronald Dworkin 
have suggested that all property in the state of nature be auctioned off by the state to the 
highest bidder.6 But that suggestion to loses its operational appeal once we realize how 
difficult it would be to organize its operation before all potential bidders died of 
starvation. We (by which I mean all early societies, without exception) therefore adopt a 
rule of first possession for the acquisition of land and chattels from the state of nature.7  
Reluctantly, we reach a similar conclusion here. A rule that assigns the cause of 
action to the victim of the wrong is less expensive to operate than any auction that we 
might set up; it enjoys legitimacy with a populus that quickly tires of strange mind games 
played by fevered law professors; it usually ends up giving the right of action to an 
individual who is in a good position to prosecute the suit himself; and, most critically, it 
allows that person to enter into side contracts with other individuals (call them lawyers) 
for the prosecution of that suit, if it turns out that they do not have the skills to do it 
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themselves. Indeed, in principle it could allow the individuals to sell the claims to other 
persons, even by auction, if that seems appropriate, as it often is in cases that involve the 
collection of receivables. But most often the contingent fee arrangement is the vehicle of 
choice because it gives access to adjudication to aggrieved persons with both limited 
wealth and limited ability to monitor the conduct of their lawyers. The bottom line here is 
that the initial allocation of the right of action to the person who suffers from its breach 
looks on examination to comport not only with the shadowy dictates of natural justice, 
but also to have real efficiency justifications that no global auction can duplicate. It gives 
a quick, clear and determinate owner for the right of action in question, regardless of its 
substantive content, and that person can make voluntary dispositions of the cause of 
action, including contingent fee or other sharing arrangements, in the event that he is not 
the ideal claimant. Auctions are possible, after a fashion. Yet they are run not by the state, 
but by the owner of the cause of action. 
Once we have reached this simple empirical conclusion, then we can ask the 
painful but necessary question: is it good in each and every case? In this case, our usual 
view that a cause of action flows from the violation of the substantive right takes on 
following salient features. First, there is one and only one person who is victim of the 
rights violation. It is the defendant who has taken plaintiff’s plow; no other plow has been 
taken. The value of the thing is large not only in absolute terms but also relative to the 
costs A has to incur to recover that plow from B. The legal system moreover will yield 
reliable results, such that A can prosecute his suit for a small cost, with some confidence 
that he will win on a meritorious claim. 
Once we make these implicit assumptions explicit, then we can identify why the 
system of private rights is workable. By adopting an inflexible rule that each owner of 
property retains the right of action for its theft or destruction, we have eliminated a major 
stumbling block in organizing the legal system. A must still prove that the plow was his, 
for the defendant will win if he can show that he lent the plow to the plaintiff, with the 
understanding that it would be returned on demand. But no system of procedure can 
eliminate that factual dispute. Our rule only gets rid of the distraction that arises when 
some third party is endowed with this cause of action. That said, the plaintiff here will act 
normally as a self-interested person, which means that he will bring suit only if he 
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estimates at the outset that his expected gain from the suit will exceed his expected costs. 
Both the cost of the legal system and the reliability of its processes enter into the 
plaintiff’s crude calculations. Thus if the plow is worth $1,000 and the cost of suit equals 
$100, then, if recovery is certain, A will sue, for a net $900 leaves him better off given 
that the plow was taken, even if he is worse off than if the plow had never been taken. 
But this calculation ignores the risk of loss. If plaintiff thinks that he has only a 75 
percent chance of winning the case, how his expected gain drops to $650, equal to the 
$750 he expects to recover (i.e. 0.75 x $1,000 - $100). But let the costs go up to $500, 
and the chances of success drop to 40 percent, and all of a sudden, the suit does not look 
attractive no matter how sound the underlying cause of action: a $400 recovery is less 
than $500 cost. 
We are now in a position to understand the origin and appeal of the class action in 
some, but not all cases. Quite simply, the unthinkable becomes thinkable when the basic 
scenario changes. All that we need do in order to make this happen is to alter three 
parameters. The first of these is that the number of individuals similarly situated with 
respect to a common defendant is very large. The second is that the loss sustained by 
each party is relatively small. The third is that the administrative costs of individual suit 
turn out to be quite high. In these circumstances we can now see the consequences of a 
rule that allows each aggrieved individual to bring his own suit. Quite simply, he will not 
accept this invitation if the costs of litigation exceed the level of recovery, which could 
easily happen with the high price of lawyers. Within the framework of voluntary 
transactions, we might expect A to sell his claim, but any individual buyer will face all 
the problems that beset A and still have to enlist A’s support in order to make his claim 
good.  
The obvious escape hatch to this impasse in a voluntary world is for all the 
individuals to pool their claims together (under the rules of permissive joinder, as 
authorized under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules) in order to take advantage of what they 
hope will prove to be economies of scale. These rules limit the use of permissive joinder 
to cases in which the parties pursue their rights “in respect of or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” But this limitation on 
the use of permissive joinder hardly binds at all, for unless this condition is satisfied the 
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individual plaintiffs have little reason to pursue cooperative activities. After all, the hope 
of parties in a permissive joinder situation is that the cost of suit will rise less rapidly than 
the value of the amalgamated claims, so that in union they will find strength. But 
typically they quickly learn that these negotiations are fraught with difficulty for someone 
has to put together the pool that divides expenses and recovery, and someone has to 
decide how much each claimant should contribute, both initially and thereafter. Since we 
are, by hypothesis, still in a world of free bargaining, nothing compels each person to 
accept a prorata share of expenses and gains upon joining into the pool in question. It is 
possible for individuals to holdout for a larger share of the gain on condition of joining 
the business. The process could take place quite subtlety, as when one party insists on a 
minimum level of recovery out of the common pool, which leaves other people at greater 
risk and could induce them to make the same demands until 150 percent of the pie is fully 
accounted for. What makes this problem so difficult to deal with is that holdouts, wishing 
to avoid rebuke, often take concealed and not brazen approaches toward individual 
aggrandizement. They claim that their claim really is worth a great deal more than 
anyone else thinks and calibrate their demands to the perceived value of their interest. 
Bargaining breakdown is highly probable in these circumstances, which is just what we 
should expect. We can think of the defendant, as seen through the eyes of members of the 
plaintiff class, as though he were a common pool asset (say oil and gas under the land of 
multiple landowners), and the plaintiffs each as claimants to the some fraction of the 
pool. Often it happens that the surface owners cannot agree on any appropriate split of 
expenses and recovery, so each takes an independent course of action that leads to 
excessive costs of extraction whose necessary byproduct is the reduction of the total oil 
and gas taken from the pool. Permissive joinder in these cases can work in some 
circumstance. But often it does not. It is the failures that explain the rise of the class 
action. 
Class Actions for Voluntary Associations. To see how the argument works, it is 
best examine it in an environment that is most hospitable to the class action, that is, those 
situations where all plaintiffs have interests that have been crafted the same under the 
substantive law. Suppose that the question at hand is disputed behavior in a corporation, 
partnership or some voluntary association. A common version of the complaint is that a 
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key corporate officer has purchased a collective asset in a cozy transaction for a sum well 
below its market price. The remedy in this case is to unravel the transaction so that the 
asset is returned to the corporation and the cash to the individual buyer. (I ignore all 
complications with the time value of money, subsequent transactions and the like.) The 
question is who is in the best position to maintain the suit to undo this transaction. In 
principle the action belongs to the corporation; but notwithstanding its lofty legal status, a 
corporation has no independent powers of self-generation. Usually the directors act as 
“its” agents and in this case they have fallen asleep at the switch. So at least one 
shareholder has to step up to the plate for the corporation, AKA the other shareholders in 
question. So how this transaction is organized?  
One possible way is to think of a permissive joinder suit among shareholders, but 
this fails for a number of critical reasons. First, chronic coordination problems can arise 
with shareholders every bit as much as it can with surface owners. Second, the proposed 
relief is indivisible in that it benefits one shareholder as much (or as little) as the next. As 
noted earlier the proper procedure is to unravel the transaction so that the thing is restored 
to the corporation, usually with its purchase price refunded to the outsider. That form of 
relief benefits all shareholders whether they participate in the litigation or not: it is not 
just the case as “a practical matter,” as Rule 23 says; rather it is as a necessary matter 
deriving from the structure of the corporation itself. In this setting, we now have the 
worry that some shareholders will simply choose to free ride on the efforts of others. 
They will bear none of the costs of running the suit (and the consequent risk of failure). 
Yet they will stand to gain equally with all other shareholders once the corporation has 
recovered the asset in question. The danger in this situation is not that of excessive and 
ungrounded suits by rapacious class action attorneys. Unless something is done to fix up 
the imbalance, the real risk is that serious wrongdoing at the corporate level will go 
unchecked for want of a champion to deal with the problem. 
The standard response has been to craft the derivative action whose origin has 
been neatly summarized as follows: 
In these circumstances, the shareholders’ injury (diminution in the value 
of their shares) derives from the fact that the alleged misconduct has reduced the 
value of the corporation’s assets. Further, this type of derivative injury is suffered 
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in common by all shareholders according to their proportionate interest in the 
corporation. The shareholders’ derivative suit was created by equity courts to 
permit a shareholder to vindicate wrongs done to the corporation as a whole that 
management, because of either self-interest or neglect, would not remedy.8 
So at this point we can now start to see how, at least in some core cases, the class 
action operates as a system of forced exchanges that works for the benefit of the 
individuals who are subject to the state-generated coercion. At this point we are not 
talking about class actions across the board, but solely one special instance of them, the 
derivative suit, brought by shareholders in the name of the corporation, or its analogues 
for associations and partnerships. The basic logic is this: the knight who steps forward to 
maintain the suit is paid by the corporation out of the winnings of the action. This simple 
expedient at first look has all the right incentive features. In the first place, once we 
pierce through the corporate veil, we discover that the champion has worked for the 
benefit of all the other shareholders. Since these individuals all hold fungible interests, 
we can treat the fractional interest in the corporation as marking their precise stake in the 
outcome of the litigation. It is not as though the claim is, in the words of Rule 23 
“typical” of those of other class members. It is that these actions are all “identical,” so 
that from a structural point of view we cannot conceive of a better class representative. 
At this point the conclusion clearly follows: once the action is successfully 
brought, then the payment issue can be solved by ordering the corporation (i.e. the 
shareholders) to make an appropriate payment to the outside champion. If the applicable 
rules so allow, the corporation in turn could be allowed some recovery of those fees from 
the wrongdoer under a version of the winner-takes-all method. But that wrinkle should 
depend more on the fee shifting rules generally, and not on the particulars of class 
actions.  Each member of the class bears the same fractional interest in the payment as he 
obtains from the successful recovery, so that the rule in question divides up the gains 
from the transaction in accordance with their respective investments. No one is allowed 
to opt out of this particular class—see Rule 23(c)(2)— which is just as it should be, 
because the nature of the relief—restoration to the corporation—works to his benefit. But 
then, why would anyone want to back out when the alternative is to get nothing at all? 
                                                 
8  Jesse H. Choper et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 785-86 (3rd ed. 1989). 
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Invariance in Aggregation Thus far it looks as though the derivative suit is the 
world’s perfect class action in that it forces all shareholders to deviate from their initial 
property holdings in ways that leave them better off than before. In practice this 
conclusion is, of course, too optimistic because the complete package requires us to 
develop rules for the selection and compensation of attorneys, which is not so easily 
done.  I shall pass by these issues here, in order to pursue the central theme of this paper: 
whether, and if so, how the aggregation of individual claims within the class action 
format leads to a distortion of the substantive law that works typically in favor of the 
plaintiffs, not only within the confines of these corporate and associational cases.  
At this point, the vital concern involves the interplay between substantive and 
procedural law in dealing with class actions. As noted earlier, treating the class action as 
a procedural rule carries with it profound implications. Quite simply, as a matter of 
theory, the class action functions solely as an aggregation device to allow the pursuit of 
claims that could otherwise not be brought because of the high rate of administrative cost 
relative to the anticipated recovery. As the Supreme Court held in Amchem, the central 
purpose of the class action “is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not 
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her 
rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential 
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s labor).”9  In principle, 
therefore, we should hold the substantive law constant regardless of whether the plaintiffs 
proceed by individual action, permissive joinder, or class action. Thus, the class format 
does not alter the terms of the basic cause of action; nor does it introduce some new 
defenses, or eliminate others, in the prosecution of the case. The whole point here is to 
avoid any extraneous influence that would give parties a reason to either bring or refuse 
to bring a class action. The substantive outcomes should not be distorted by the choice of 
procedural vehicle. 
                                                 
9 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 617 (1997), quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997). 
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This invariance constraint has powerful roots in other substantive areas of law. 
One common theatre in which the point is raised is bankruptcy.10 Ordinary firms have 
relationships with multiple creditors antecedent to and outside of bankruptcy. The ideal 
bankruptcy system allows for the coordination of multiple claims, the marshaling of the 
defendant’s assets, and a key decision over whether to liquidate or reorganize the basic 
business.11 These issues are hard enough to resolve in their own right, and the ideal set of 
procedural rules is not one that induces parties to go into or to avoid bankruptcy solely on 
the grounds of the relative procedural advantages of the various fora. Thus, it would be 
quite dangerous if the legal position allowed a plaintiff-creditor to defeat a statute of 
limitations defense available in state court by filing for bankruptcy. At this point they 
may well choose an inefficient place to litigate in order to gain a partisan advantage. 
Defendants will have equal and opposite incentives, and the whole system could easily 
grind to a halt, for in both cases the private advantage creates a social disadvantage. 
Likewise, in dealing with private land use disputes between neighbors, it is 
important to keep parallelism between the ordinary tort actions that some neighbors can 
bring against another and the actions (often class actions) that the state can bring on 
behalf of some neighbors against others. Let the state be given substantive or procedural 
advantages not available to the individual plaintiffs, and enforcement will migrate into 
public hands even if the private law offers systematically superior substantive solutions 
on the issues. Likewise, if the private law is systematically more advantageous to 
plaintiffs, they now have an incentive to resist more efficient class actions solely to 
obtain partisan advantages. In all these cases, then, we should be careful to see that the 
amalgamation of claims does not alter the balance of power between the two sides except 
insofar as it overcomes the transactional obstacles that justify the use of the class action 
in the first place. It is for just this reason that zoning rules are so often problematic. In 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n,12 the state sought to prevent any construction 
on a beachfront lot by regulation. No private neighbor could obtain an injunction to that 
                                                 
10 See Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Beard Books (1986); Corporate 
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests, Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, 
Stanford Law School (1983) 
11 See, e.g. Douglas Baird, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002) 
12 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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effect, but would have to purchase a restrictive covenant. The switch from the private to 
the public forum should not result in a fundamental change in the ground rules, and the 
strength of that decision is that it prevented that maneuver from happening in the most 
egregious fashion, although it left open the possibility of sustaining lesser forms of 
regulation without compensation. As with bankruptcy, the switch in forum should not 
result in a radical change in the rules of compensation.13 
This program is, moreover, easy to implement in connection with the ordinary 
derivative suit against private associations and corporate defendants. Here all the 
plaintiffs are in precisely the same position, so that the court need only ask itself how it 
would resolve the suit if all the shares in question were held by a single person who had 
an action against members of the board of directors. But the concerns here become much 
more serious in the modern class action in which amalgamation and distortion could go 
hand in hand.  
Class Actions for Damages. This invariance proposition is, however, sorely tested 
in the context of the modern class actions, which arise outside the corporate and 
association situations where what is sought is a restoration in cash or kind to the 
association or corporation. Right off the bat it should be clear that the efficiency of the 
class action is necessarily reduced as it is carried over into these new situations. No 
longer do we have any fungible corporate shares that certify the indivisible nature of the 
class relief and the parallel nature of the individual claims. In addition, it is no longer 
necessary to limit the class suit to a single (corporate) defendant, which increases the 
complexity of administration. The first of these elements falls to the wayside because 
there is no legal entity to which the damages in question can be paid. When someone is 
run over by a truck, gouged by a monopolist, victimized by discrimination, consumer or 
securities fraud, he sustained his loss in his individual capacity. The usual demand is for 
cash relief, to be paid to each person separately. These claims, moreover, may be 
analogous in some ways but different in others.14 The individual plaintiffs may have been 
                                                 
13 For my discussion of these issues, see, Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven 
Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Rev. 955 (1993). 
14 For a merciless dissection of such claims, see the decision of Easterbrook, J. in In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, (7th Cir. 2002). 
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sold goods at different times, for different prices, by different salesmen. Shareholders 
may have bought and sold stocks at different times in the period before a takeover bid is 
announced. Often the claims involve individuals in different states with different 
substantive law. The claims may have some elements in common, but also some 
important differences. Often the salience of these differences and similarities may not be 
fully apparent at the outset of the suit, but only become apparent once discovery has been 
undertaken, or perhaps even at trial. The upshot is that the critical decision on class action 
certification often has to take place prior to any genuine assessment as to what the 
ultimate shape of the claims will be. In this regard, the identification of appropriate class 
members could easily shift over the life of the litigation. 
To their credit, the current class rules appear to recognize the difference in 
context. The rules contain no provisions for opt-outs for Rule (b)(1) and Rule (b)(2) class 
actions, where the relief is indivisible, but recognizes them for class actions brought 
under 23(b)(3): “the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can 
be identified through reasonable effort.” Newspaper notification will not work when 
names and addresses are available. 
The additional layers of complexity in ordinary damage class actions do not 
eliminate any of the difficulties of class administration in the context of derivative 
actions. But they do add a number of additional elements that require some closer 
examination. Owing to the want of parallelism, the question arises of whether all persons 
similarly situated—itself a term of art—must become members of the class whether they 
want to or not. At least one strand of thought, championed most conspicuously by 
Professor David Rosenberg, claims that this mandatory approach is correct, and holds, in 
effect, that the conscription of individual plaintiffs into the class action really works to 
their benefit, such that they have no reason to opt out of the class to control their own 
suit.15 The law can make that judgment for them at lower cost and higher reliability. 
Indeed in one sense his position goes a step further. Since the real question is deterrence 
of defendants, he takes the view that there is no particular reason to want to distribute the 
                                                 
15 See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 
115 Harv. L. Rev. 831 (2002); David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in Regulation 
Through Litigation 244 (W. Kip Viscusi, ed. 2002). 
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money to any members of the victim class. Their protection comes in a different form: 
stronger deterrence reduces the occasions on which compensation is required. At this 
point, the entire system becomes rickety because the contours of a “mass tort” are far 
from clear in the abstract. With the asbestos litigation, for example, different individuals 
were exposed under different working conditions to fibers produced by different 
manufacturers at different times. Some of these are exposure only cases; others involve 
physical harm, which might be caused by other agents.16 In some cases it might prove 
hard to decide whether certain workers should be included in a class or not. That decision 
is momentous enough when the stakes are how the litigation should proceed. But the 
boundary condition would become far more salient if class members received no 
compensation while individual tort claimants could get full compensation. At this point, 
the class action ceases to be a simple aggregation device. It becomes an on/off switch for 
vitally different legal regimes.17  
Even if we reject (as current law manifestly does) the view that ex post 
compensation is irrelevant, powerful implications still flow for the governance of class 
action litigation. This position presupposes that the judgment should be collective and not 
individual, such that a person who objected to the strategies pursued by the class would 
be required to remain a class member on the ground that the economies of scale in 
running the class action would leave him better off than before. There is obviously a 
powerful paternalistic streak in this argument. Surely a consumer class that has 100,000 
potential members could operate if some fraction of them decided to opt out, perhaps to 
form a second class under different leadership. And, it becomes hard to insist on their 
participation in the class if these dissenters have fundamental strategic disagreements 
with the lawyers and/or class committee that takes direct control over the litigation. It 
may well be too expensive to try to recruit individuals into the class, but the transaction 
costs do not preclude a default position that preserves the individual right to opt out on 
receipt of notice, especially if they wish to join smaller, more cohesive classes. This issue 
could prove of especial importance in those situations where state-based classes have 
greater internal coherence than nationwide classes. There is already some authority that 
                                                 
16 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) 
17 For further discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Implications for Legal Reform in Regulation 
through Litigation, 310, 347-348 (W. Kip Viscusi, ed. 2002) 
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indicates that these should be the preferred norm insofar as the variations in state law 
reduce the predominance of common issues and place additional strains on the operation 
of the class.18 Nationwide classes are of course more plausible for causes of action based 
on federal law, and highly troublesome when state and federal counts are joined in the 
same master complaint. 
Stated otherwise, the situation with individual claims differs fundamentally from 
the derivative suit in that it is no longer the case that the provision of a remedy to one 
person necessarily provides a like remedy to another. When one person opts out of the 
class to bring his own suit for money damages, all other individuals may proceed under 
the class rubric if they please. The key point here is to make sure that those who hang 
back to do not benefit from the offensive use of res judicata should the class action be 
successful, while reserving the right to bring their individual suits anew should that action 
fail. 
Once individuals are allowed to opt out, they must also receive some notice, by 
publication or in person, about the terms and conditions under which the class action will 
proceed, as Rule 23 provides. In many cases where the individual sums for the class are 
small (as with the miscalculation of interest rates on small personal loans), most people 
will choose to stay put, assuming that they pay any attention to the matter at all. But, 
nothing about the current structure of the rules of civil procedure limits ordinary class 
actions to small overcharge cases. Huge tort actions and substantial antitrust claims may 
also be brought in this form, and here the choice whether to opt out is far weightier 
because the damages are anything other than “paltry”. In these cases, moreover, 
individual plaintiffs may well decide to commence their suit before any class action could 
begin, so that it is highly doubtful that a plaintiff should be bound to the class unless at 
the very least he receives actual notice of the suit, and probably not even then unless he 
agrees to a stay of his own litigation pending the outcome of the class action. After all, if 
two individuals brought suit, neither would be stopped in his tracks simply because he 
had notice of the other suit. Some evidence of collusive or opportunistic behavior would 
seemingly be required. 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulanc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995), quoting Henry J. 
Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (1973). See also, Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Syst. 
211 F.3d 1228, 1241 n. 21 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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The issue of class membership has, moreover, important consequences for the 
defendant, although it is difficult in the abstract to say which way they cut. On the one 
hand, corralling all the plaintiffs in an individual class action reduces the litigation costs 
for the defendant, and avoids the possibility of follow-on suits (from which the plaintiffs 
can learn from earlier strategic mistakes even if they do not have the benefit of res 
judicata). On the other hand, the creation of a huge nationwide class makes it impossible 
for a defendant to diversify its litigation portfolio. The litigation may easily assume what 
some courts have called “you-bet-the-company” proportions19 and lead to what has been 
called, perhaps somewhat loosely, coercive settlements. The high stakes may well induce 
some juries, and indeed some judges, to adopt a compromise position that is ruinous to 
the defendant’s interest, and the possibility of error in so complex a lawsuit is something 
that an innocent defendant should greet with dread. After all, a ten percent exposure to a 
$10 billion verdict counts as real money, even today. 
The amalgamation of individual damage claims raises yet another question of no 
simple proportions. Which claimants, holding which claims, should be eligible to 
participate in a class action in the first place? That problem was solved almost by 
definition in the derivative suit because each plaintiff occupied a position that was largely 
indistinguishable from other members of the class. The issue of class membership is 
solved in the ordinary action by making each shareholder a member of the class to the 
extent of his own interest. But with separate claims the matter becomes far murkier. The 
key trade-off is easy to state. The gains from amalgamation increase as the claims are 
more similar to each other; but these economies of scale are much reduced to the extent 
that individual claims differ from one another on some material point. 
In 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made a conscious effort to liberalize 
the scope of the class action by adopting a posture that asks whether “the questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
                                                 
19 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (class action would turn a 
$200,000 dispute into a $200,000,000 dispute). 
Class Actions March 27, 2003 20 
only individual members,”20 which covers not only those issues relevant to the plaintiff’s 
skeletal prima facie case, but to the full range of claims or defenses raised in the case.21 
That predominance requirement is generally satisfied in cases of antitrust 
violation where all sales within a given period were made as part of the same business 
scheme to the same set of plaintiffs.22 The level of perceived overcharge (assuming that 
the members of the plaintiff class have standing to sue, which may be problematic in 
some cases of “indirect purchasers”23) is roughly constant so that once the difference 
between the monopoly and the competitive price is determined for one party in one 
transaction, then it is largely determined for all. This argument presupposes that a single 
scheme controlled multiple separate transactions, such that the outer limits of the class 
could well be sensitive to changes in the defendant’s pricing policies or its relationships 
with other firms in the industry. There remains the constant gnawing problem that distinct 
state law claims may well be governed by different laws that make their amalgamation 
harder to justify.24 But in general these cases will be amenable to some level of class 
formation. Even if all potential plaintiffs do not fit snugly within the confines of a single 
class, it is easy to imagine a couple of subclasses that will cover the vast bulk of cases. 
The problem of class actions becomes much more difficult in dealing with tort 
claims, including mass tort claims. The original notes to the 1966 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure made it seem doubtful that any ordinary tort claim could be subject to class 
actions. “A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not 
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only 
of damages but of liability and defenses to liability would be present, affecting the 
individuals in different ways.” Thus even if two individuals were hit by the same car at 
the same time, the issues in the two cases could overlap but not be precisely the same. 
Here much could turn on the theory of liability. If liability were strict, so that the only 
question was whether this defendant hit both plaintiffs, then the issue could easily be 
common between the parties. But if liability is based on negligence, then the defendant 
                                                 
20 Rule 23 (b)(3). 
21 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 note 18. 
22 Potash Class Action FRD 1995. 
23 On which see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
24 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), 
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might have been negligent with respect to the plaintiff in plain view but not with respect 
to one that was not within his line of vision. Or some jurisdictions could adopt a principle 
of “transferred negligence,” such that the defendant who was aware that one plaintiff was 
in the field of danger, is liable in negligence to a second defendant who could have been 
spared injuries if the defendant had taken only those precautions needed to deal with the 
plaintiff in plain view. 
The situation with mass torts, of course, only becomes more difficult when the 
defendant has engaged in a similar line of business over a long period of time, such as the 
selling of asbestos or a pharmaceutical product. In these cases we lose the Aristotelian 
unities of time and space, so that one might think that only rarely would the class action 
be appropriate in suits of this sort under the Federal Rules. But a set of ambitious 
certifications in a wide variety of cases, moving from blood transfusions to cigarettes, 
indicates how the law has migrated from its initial cautious attitudes in these cases to a 
far more aggressive stance. A similar migration can be found in cases involving 
misrepresentations, where the 1966 attitude toward misrepresentations, which was 
prepared to allow many actions where the separate cases had a “common core,” but not in 
those instances where “although having some common core, a fraud case may be 
unsuited for treatment as a class action if there were material variation in the 
representations made or in the kinds of degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they 
were addressed.” The current attitude seems to be that even if the common issues do not 
dominate the law suits, then the appropriate response is to use the class action for those 
issues that are common and, thereafter, to allow the cases to be tried or settled separately: 
strategic advantage to the plaintiff.25 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Line, 267 F.3d 147, 167-168 (2d Cir. 2001); see 
also See, e.g., Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996): “Even if the common 
questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire action is 
warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under 
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.” Rule 24(c)(4)(A) in turn 
provides that “an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues. . . . 
.” If Rule 24(c)(4)(A) is read to allow class action status to be determined issue by issue, then it makes a 
dead letter of the overall predominance requirement for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, which is why this 
provision has been read to provide a mere “housekeeping rule” that does not upset the requirements for a 
Rule 23(b)(3). See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court in 
Amchen appears to look at predominance in connection with the full range of anticipated issues raised in 
the case. Amchen, 521 U.S. at 622-623.  
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This brief discussion shows how difficult it is to decide at the outset of the lawsuit 
whether the common issues are sufficient to dominate the separate ones. What is the cart 
and what is the horse? Normally we would like to know whether plaintiffs are similarly 
situated before we decide what legal theory is relevant in their case. But now it looks as 
though we cannot decide whether two or more claims are dominated by common issues 
until we decide which theory of liability is invoked. The problem, moreover, only gets 
worse when the plaintiffs seek to pursue class actions and unities of time and place are 
not strictly observed. 
For example, in product liability actions the defendant may have sold a given drug 
in different tablet sizes with different warnings in different locations over different times. 
It could be that the jurisdiction in question uses a strict liability theory for any defects, at 
which point the variations in the level of care may not matter. But, if the action relates to 
the duty to warn, a warning that was effective in 1980, when the knowledge base was 
more limited, may turn out to be insufficient in 1990 when the level of public knowledge 
became greater. The situation gets no easier if it turns out the role of intermediate parties, 
or of the plaintiffs themselves differ in some material way. The individual incidents could 
easily take place in different states.  
Aggregation and Distortion. The difficulties with respect to damage class actions 
quickly raise the question of aggregation versus distortion. One possible approach is to let 
the chips fall where they may. The first thing that the Court does is to find out the full 
level of heterogeneity among class members by taking the substantive law as it is, and not 
as it might become. If the differences are too large, then the class action fails, either 
because there are no “typical” claims to meet the threshold requirements for any class 
action under Rule 23 (a) or because it is not possible to meet the predominance 
requirement under Rule 23 (b)(3).26  
Just this remorseless reading of the class action law was found in Judge 
Easterbrook’s forceful opinion denying both nationwide and statewide class certification 
for beach of warranty claims for Firestone and Bridgestone tires, which performed poorly 
and were subject to recall. The initial question in these cases concerned the choice of law 
issue. The plaintiffs in Bridgestone/Firestone argued that all these recall cases should be 
                                                 
26 For a discussion of the two-tiered approach, see Amchem Products 521 U.S. at 613-614. 
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treated as contract not tort cases, so that they could all be adjudicated under the 
substantive law of each defendant’s principal place of business. The traditional rule that 
ties contract claims to the place where the consumer resides, typically the place of sale, 
would obviously place a major obstacle in the path of a nationwide class action. Judge 
Easterbrook found that the plaintiff’s reinterpretation of Indiana choice of law rules was 
clear: Indiana would apply its own consumer protection laws to any transaction involving 
an in-state consumer who purchased goods within the state. From that point, the 
nationwide class was headed toward extinction. “It follows that Indiana’s choice-of-law 
rule selects the 50 states and multiple territories where the buyers live, and not the place 
of the sellers’ headquarters for these suits.”27 
What about a statewide class? In the next breath, Easterbrook looked over the 
substantive law in light of the many different factual patterns and held that the differences 
prevailed.   
About 20% of the Ford Explorers were shipped without Firestone tires. The 
Firestone tires supplied with the majority of the vehicles were recalled at different 
times; they may well have differed in their propensity to fail, and this would 
require sub-subclassing among the owners of Ford Explorers and Firestone tires. 
Some of these vehicles were resold and others have not been; the resales may 
have reflected different discounts that could require vehicle-specific litigation. 
Plaintiffs contend many of the failures occurred because Ford and Firestone 
advised the owners to underinflate their tires, leading them to overheat. Other 
factors also affect heating; the failure rate (and hence the discount) may have been 
higher in Arizona than in Alaska.28 
And so it goes. A clear knowledge of a fair sampling of the probable issues in the 
case doomed this class action, and has made the Seventh Circuit a most inhospitable 
jurisdiction for large class actions. I think that in most cases this analysis is sound, in that 
the level of common elements in many mass torts are far less dominant than others 
believe. I would follow, as many federal courts today do not, the lead of the 1966 Federal 
Rules in presumptively denying class actions in most mass tort cases. I realize that this 
                                                 
27 Id at p.8: 
28 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2002) 
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result may place some plaintiffs at a serious disadvantage, in that the defendant is geared 
up with a standard form defense that it tweaks in each individual case. But even in these 
cases, the issues of defendant’s liability, causal intervention, plaintiff’s knowledge or 
misuse, and plaintiff’s damages could all differ from case to case, so that when the dust 
settles the standard form defense may not be all that standard. It remains possible, of 
course, for plaintiffs to form a voluntary loose alliance in which they share information 
about common issues while controlling their individual causes of action. But it is much 
riskier to follow the pattern of amalgamation, for once the cases are together then the 
individual differences in the plaintiff’s cases will be bled out of the equation, so that all 
suits will appear to be cut from the same cloth. As the choice of forum will normally lie 
within the control of plaintiffs, it is likely that the substantive law will drift in their favor. 
As will quickly become evident, there are many jurisdictions that are less 
responsive to the fear that the aggregation of individual claims will lead not only to 
(unbaised) amplification, but also to distortion. Here the great danger is that courts in 
close (and not so close cases) will adopt that version of the substantive law that facilitates 
class action suits. Several examples are in order from securities law, antitrust, and 
employment discrimination.  
Let us start with securities law. Basic Inc. v. Levinson29 involved the question of 
whether the officers and directors of the corporation had violated the provision of Rule 
10b-5 relating to the publication of misleading information, in this case a false denial that 
the firm was engaged in potential merger negotiations, when in fact it was. One effect of 
this denial was arguably to lower the price of the shares so as to induce class members to 
sell before the merger was formally announced. In an ordinary action for common law 
fraud, the plaintiffs must prove that they have relied in specific transactions to their 
detriment on the false statements made by the defendant. But, in this case the defendants 
were not sellers of the shares; nor did they make any specific statements to identifiable 
purchasers. If each plaintiff had been forced to show his own reliance on some particular 
false statements, then it would be impossible to keep the class intact. But once the 
Supreme Court accepted a “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which presumes that efficient 
capital markets quickly embed all false information into the price, then the element of 
                                                 
29 485 U.S. 224 (1988)  
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reliance flips over from a separate to a common issue. No longer is it relevant to ask 
whether this plaintiff sold because he needed to pay college tuition or that plaintiff 
bought because he had received a large commission. The removal of the last traces of 
individual motivation allows the class to hold together. I have no doubt that one reason 
why the Supreme Court embraced this substantive theory was to foster the use of class 
actions in securities case. Yet even here its conclusion can be criticized on the ground 
that the presumption of reliance is at most rebuttable, so that the defendant could try to 
show, on a case by case basis, that individual plaintiffs had disbelieved the information 
when published. But rebuttable evidence is admissible only in a small fraction of cases, 
so that even the shift in the burden of proof allows the class action to go forward under 
standards that would not be used in individual cases. 
The question of causation comes up in other circumstances as well. In In re Visa 
Check/Master Money,30 the antitrust issue before the Second Circuit was whether Visa 
and MasterCard had adopted tie-in arrangements in violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act in setting their interchange fees—that is, the fees that the acquiring bank (which has 
signed up the merchant) must pay to the card-issuing bank (which has signed up the 
individual consumer).31 Both Visa and MasterCard issue both credit and debit cards. The 
former allows for a genuine extension of credit, but the latter allows the charge to go 
through only if the customer in question has sufficient funds in his or her account to 
cover the charge in question. It is clear that credit transactions pose greater risk of loss 
than debit transactions, yet in order to acquire the right to use Visa and MasterCard’s 
credit services, the merchant had to accept all debit cards in these two-sided markets.32 
The interchange fees payable on these two accounts are the same amount, even though 
the level of risk is different.  
In these cases, there is no doubt that the defendant’s uniform policy requiring all 
participating merchants to “honor all cards” is a common element in the class action 
                                                 
30 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001). 
31 Id. at 130 & note 2. 
32 These are markets that can operate only where the intermediate guarantees to each side that certain 
persons on the opposite of the market will be present. Thus no one will acquire a credit card if there is no 
place to use it; likewise no one will honor credit cards if customers do not have them. For an extensive 
discussion of the issues that these markets raise, see David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Paying with 
Plastic: ETC.   
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calculus. But it is equally clear that the level of damages, should liability be established, 
may well depend on the interdependence between the interchange rates set for debit and 
credit cards. On this matter, the initial question is whether the refusal to allow the tie-in 
arrangement between debit and credit cards would lead to an increase in the interchange 
fees for the credit card to offset, at least in part, the decline in revenues from debit cards. 
The two views on this subject have been dubbed the “tied product” and the “package 
method” respectively.33 Under the former method, the only question asked concerns the 
difference between the interchange fee paid and the interchange fee that would have been 
paid for the unbundled debit-card product sold on the open market. The alternative mode 
of analysis allows for the recovery of damages only to the extent that the plaintiff has 
overpaid for the package of tied and tying products. Stated otherwise, if the interchange 
fee for the ordinary credit card transactions rose to offset in whole or in part the decline 
in revenues from the debit card, then the damages in question are now equal to the 
savings on the debit card less the increases on the credit card. That calculation, obviously, 
offers a more accurate account of the consequences of any antitrust violation, but is of 
course more difficult to calculate. It is, however, also the case that the simplification in 
this case necessarily increases the expected liability of the defendant, unlike one that 
presupposes that each member of the class has suffered the mean amount of damages, 
under which the expected cost to the defendant remains unchanged.  
For these purposes, however, this first risk cascades into a second. Individual 
merchants within a nationwide (or even single state) class do not have a fixed ratio of 
credit to debit transactions. High-end sellers may well sell more by credit card and less by 
debit card than low-end merchants. If the offset were allowed it would create a serious 
conflict within the class ranks. Indeed for a merchant whose customers predominantly 
used credit cards, the increase in credit card rates could make them worse off than before, 
which creates a serious conflict of interest that breaks up any class, state or national, of 
any and all merchants who enter into debit card transactions. Just these arguments were 
voiced vigorously in the dissent,34 but the majority of the Court held that the class could 
be preserved for one of two reasons: either the plaintiff’s expert was correct to assume 
                                                 
33 See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 142-143 (2d Cir. 2001). 
34 Id. at 153-61, complete with numerical examples. 
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that the separation of debit from credit cards would have resulted in no increase in the 
interchange fees for the credit transactions, or that the set-off was not appropriate as a 
matter of theory.35 I have no doubt that in an ordinary action brought by a single plaintiff 
against the single defendant, a court would, or at least should, follow the economic rule 
that requires burdens to be offset against benefits, and commit both parties to proof on 
this question.36 But once that procedure threatens class certification, then exactly the 
opposite takes place. A low standard is used to pass on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim 
for class certification, so that the entire matter of the proper measure of damages left in 
abeyance until the class is formed, only to be sorted out only thereafter.37 The net effect is 
that the burden shifts to the defendant to find ways to disentangle itself from class status 
only after the armies have massed on the other side of the table. Yet there is, as best one 
can tell, the class formation itself supplies no new evidence or insight on how the 
measure of damage question should be decided. These clear tactical edges really matter, 
especially in a lawsuit in which the potential damages could range, giving trebling, up to 
$100 billion.  Yet the theme here is not new. It is just another variation of the dominant 
theme of the measure of damages in Basic where the benefits that follow from some 
practice—there the false announcement of no merger activity are ignored—while its costs 
are taken into account, which can only lead to a perverse form of overdeterrence. The 
desire to preserve the class action has profound consequences on the structure of the 
substantive law: aggregation produces intense distortion. 
Finally, the same theme can be observed in antidiscrimination cases. Thus Visa 
Check relied on the earlier decision in Caridad v. Metro North Commuter Railroad38 a 
class action suit for employment discrimination in discipline and promotion brought 
forward under a disparate impact theory. The disparate impact theory, of course, allows a 
plaintiff to challenge the effect of certain practices without impugning the motives or 
intentions of the employers who engage in them. Once the disparate impact is shown, 
                                                 
35 Id. at 136-37. 
36 See II Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P 365c, at 245 (rev. ed. 1995), 
cited in In re Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 154. 
37 For a sustained attack on the view that class certification should be done without a searching view 
on the merits, see Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 
Duke L.J, 1251 (2002).  
38 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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then the defendant can justify its conduct only by an appeal to business necessity—
everywhere acknowledged as a tough standard to meet. Metro-North was a commuter 
railroad that employed around 5,000 workers of whom around 1,300 were African-
American whose employment contracts were governed by some sixteen collective 
bargaining agreements, but subject to Metro-North’s Progressive Disciplinary System, 
which is administered at the field level by some 400 supervisors and managers, all of 
whom are capable of bringing charges against individual workers. There was one 
complaint voiced by Metro-North’s Affirmative Action Director about the 
disproportionate number of disciplinary incidents involving people of color. Of the 27 
named plaintiffs, nineteen alleged that they suffered unfair discipline because of race.  
On the promotion side, the plaintiffs alleged that the declared policy of internal 
promotion require that all openings be posted, but gives to the manager of each unit the 
final power to fill the vacancy in question.  In practice, postings were a mere formality in 
some cases and omitted in others. The individual black plaintiff alleged that he had been 
passed over in favor of four white applicants who were less qualified than he was. Using 
a regional standard of proportional representation, underutilization of African-Americans 
was found in five of eight categories.  
The question was whether this information was sufficient to support a class action 
certification, which the District Court refused to issue but was overturned under an abuse 
of discretion standard.39 That phrase, however, does not quite mean what it says, because 
the standard for abuse is a lot tougher when the District Court refuses certification than 
when it allows it. There is of course no obvious explanation based on the relative 
competence of District and Appellate Courts that supports this one-way ratchet, which 
turned out to be quite important in the instant case. Once the moving standard of review 
took place, the court noted that the class certification stage was not the moment to 
examine the case closely on its merits, and thus allowed the plaintiff’s statistical case to 
carry the day.  
For these purposes, however, the key point is the transformation of the substantive 
theory on which this case was brought. To see why, think of how these cases would be 
tried as individual law suits for employment discrimination. At that point, the litigation 
                                                 
39 Id. at 291. 
Class Actions March 27, 2003 29 
would start from the ground up with detailed examinations of the work records of the 
individual employees coupled with a close examination of the charges and 
countercharges that surrounded the decision on either discipline or promotion. The 
outcome of these cases could be quite different because the workers had different jobs 
and the decisions on promotion and discipline were made by individuals widely dispersed 
throughout the organization. Tried in isolation, virtually the only feature that holds these 
cases together are the broad parameters of disparate impact and disparate treatment 
theory, which cannot supply the needed common element across cases without wholly 
trivializing the class action process. In practice, the trial in each case would depend on 
fact specific information. It is for that reason that the plaintiff class offered an amalgam 
of statistical and anecdotal evidence to state its grievances.40 No longer could an 
employer show that the individual employee grievance was misguided. Even a traditional 
disparate impact case could not survive a showing that the particular employee had been 
convicted of theft, had used drugs or suffered chronic absenteeism.  
In some cases, individual plaintiffs seek to make out disparate impact by pointing 
to some firm-wide substantive policy that fostered some forbidden disparate impact. But 
in this case the only relevant general policy was a system-wide commitment toward 
affirmative action. In this context, the defendants might, with some justification, use its 
affirmative action program to help explain any differential rates in discipline or 
promotion that existed at Metro-North. After all an affirmative action program requires 
Metro-North to take some high risk moves ex ante, and these could help explain (perhaps 
in some units but not in others) the differential rates in promotion and discipline ex post. 
A neutral standard should be expected to yield lower rates of promotion for workers 
drawn from an affirmative action pool with weaker objective qualifications. It should be 
clear that these disparate impact cases have moved a long way from the original dubious 
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power41 which only asked whether certain general aptitude 
tests might be administered when the pass rates for blacker applicants were significantly 
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41 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For my criticisms, see Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds 192-201 
(1992). Any debate over the statutory authorization of disparate treatment cases has been set to rest by the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. For an account of the modern 
rules, see Arthur Larson et al, Employment Discrimination § 9.03[2]. 
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lower than they were for whites. Injunctive relief might be appropriate to prevent the use 
of the test, but individual cases for damages would depend on some specific showing of 
how the test adversely impacted on the salary or other terms of an individual employee,  
In the face of this standard mode of proof, any effort to forge a class action out of 
discipline or promotion grievances, let alone the two together, would (or, alas, at least 
should) be regarded as laughable. The aggregation does not make sense. But it is at this 
point that the substantive expansion of disparate impact theory is said to fill the gap under 
a very generous class standard which finds that the “commonality” requirement for class 
actions “is met if plaintiffs’ grievances share a common element of law or of fact”42—
where the words “a” and “or” deserve to be put into italics, if not neon lights. The new 
wrong of the defendant was not its firm wide rules of equal opportunity or affirmative 
action. Rather it takes the novel form of “overdelegation”, to wit a “policy -- the 
delegation to supervisors, pursuant to company-wide policies, of discretionary authority 
without sufficient oversight -- that gives rise to common questions of fact warranting 
certification of the proposed class.”43 Judge Newman in the Second Circuit accepted this 
theory, apparently without any recognition of how far it has strayed from the original 
disparate impact cases. As stated, the decision takes what may well be sensible business 
policy—the decentralization of various kinds of employment decisions—and treats that 
as though it were a fatal wrong. In so doing this threadbare theory overlooks any 
questions of causation: the want of supervision would only matter if the individual units 
all deviated from the assigned standards in more or less the same way. But in each case, a 
trier of fact would necessarily have to find the work done at that specific unit level fell 
below the appropriate standards at the center for this alleged breach of duty to matter at 
all. Clearly that question of unit compliance raises issues that are not common to class 
even if this new substantive duty is accepted. In the end therefore is ample reason to see 
why Caridad was an appropriate precedent for Visa Check. The need to preserve a class 
action at all costs drives a court to distort the underlying theory substantive liability 
beyond recognition. We have more than aggregation at work. We have a wholesale 
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distortion of the substantive standards, the chief effect of which is to facilitate a finding 
of discrimination in cases where it is highly unlikely to appear. 
The full extent to which the procedural processes of the class action turn 
substantive law inside out is further evidenced by the subsequent history of Caridad on 
remand. Once the case was remanded to the District Court, Judge Rakoff again refused to 
certify the class and dismissed the class action, noting the lack of common issues on 
liability.44 What makes this case so striking was that after the remand in Caridad the 
plaintiff sought class certification both under Rule 23(b)(2) & (b)(3): the latter preserves 
individual opt-out rights for individual claimants, but Rule 23(b)(2) does not. In principle 
Rule 23(b)(2) reads like it is reserved for situations like those involving indivisible 
benefits to a corporation or other class members. Outside the corporate context, the 
paradigmatic case might be injunctive relief against the commission of a widespread 
nuisance that necessarily benefits all, even if the action itself is brought by only a few.  
In this case, however, the lack of any opt-out (at least until the damage phase) 
would deny individual plaintiffs control over a suit in which they have very large stakes. 
In addition, it hands the class lawyers a very large club with which to obtain a 
settlement—and to avoid competition by other lawyers who seek business from class 
members after opt-outs are allowed. The initial question is whether this trade makes sense 
in light of the interests of the class members and the defendants. For individual class 
members, the loss of the option to get out of the class has to count as a real drawback: 
after all, all options have some positive value, and the control of one’s own litigation 
cannot be regarded as a small detail within the overall scheme of civil procedure. But the 
question then arises whether the individual plaintiffs receive any compensation for this 
total loss of control. In principle, that compensation can only come if class aggregation 
strengthens their hand against the defendant. The District Court refused to change the 
basic rules of the game and thus refused to allow the class action to go forward. The 
kinds of evidence needed in these cases are a peculiar blend of statistical and anecdotal 
evidence.45 The class’s statistical evidence was all at the global level, while the defendant 
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could easily introduce evidence that took place at the unit level. In addition, none of the 
anecdotal or testimonial evidence could take place at the global level. Nor is it likely that 
the situation remain constant over the full eleven-year period covered in the litigation. 
The case, however, received a radically different treatment in the Second Circuit. 
Judge Walker, who had dissented on the class certification question in Caridad, had no 
difficulty in holding that the overdelegation theory might support injunctive relief on “a 
pattern or practice” claim, and hence support certification under Rule 23(b)(2) 
notwithstanding the individualized damage claims, which could be considered separately 
perhaps after liability was established.  Here the first point was that the court noted that 
the plaintiff was seeking both injunctive relief and damages. It then noted that the key 
question was whether the common issues associated with the injunctive portion of the 
case predominated over the separate issues that might arise with respect to individual 
causes of action for damages.  
The sensible rule here holds that injunctive relief could never predominate when 
individual damage actions are brought. That rule creates the right “bright-line” rule for 
this area and avoids expensive case-by-case determinations. On that view, Rule 23(b)(2) 
certification becomes permissible only where the plaintiff’s demand for monetary relief is 
limited to a demand for incidental damages, which do not require extensive additional 
fact-finding but which can be done (as with lost interest) by use of simple computational 
devices.46 Judge Walker, however, rejected this analysis in favor of a balancing test that 
asked whether the individual damage claims predominated over the injunctive relief or 
the reverse.  
Yet there is absolutely no way to decide how to work this balance unless one has 
some idea about the nature of the injunctive relief that is sought. But of course, no hint of 
                                                                                                                                                 
aimed at establishing the defendant’s past treatment of the protected group, and (2) testimony from 
protected class members detailing specific instances of discrimination.” 1 Arthur Larson et al., 
Employment Discrimination § 9.03[1], at 9-18 (2d ed. 2001). This passage was cited at the 
appellate level in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 267 F.3d at 158. 
46 See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). The applicable 
commentary to Rule 23 reads as follows: 
This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused to take action with 
respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling 
the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate. ... The subdivision does not 
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money 
damages. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), advisory committee note (1966) (emphasis added).  
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that is offered in Robinson. It seems almost inconceivable that injunctive relief would 
even be on the table in any individual grievance, where little if anything would turn on 
the overdelegation theory. It would of course be grotesque to allow any individual 
employee to obtain injunctive relief outside the class action framework. The entire point 
of a damage remedy is to create an incentive to avoid violation of the law, and it seems 
doubtful that anyone could frame an injunction that looks both sensible and enforceable. 
Does it make sense to enjoin the use of decentralized management techniques, when 
these are more responsive to individual variations and the floor level? Does any 
injunction make sense when it is unclear which if any units were in violation of Title VII?  
In addition, any supposed injunctive relief could not benefit equally all members 
of a class that covers employees from 1985 to 1996, many of whom had been promoted 
or not disciplined, and many of whom had doubtless left Metro-North’s employ never to 
return. Even in a class context, it is hard to think of any injunctive relief that makes sense 
in light of the comprehensive regime of affirmative action that is already in place, and 
which may have been fine-tuned since 1996, the last year covered by the class.  
In principle, class aggregation should not upset the balance between these two 
forms of relief, but once again the key distortion sets in not because injunctions make 
sense for these disputes but solely because of the greater leverage that the Rule 23(b)(2) 
class action affords. These effects continue to work their way through the entire case. 
Thus Judge Walker noted that if the entire case could not be certified as a (b)(2) class, 
then the liability phase surely could be—but not if the anecdotal evidence could freely be 
introduced. “Indeed, to ensure that the liability phase remains manageable, the district 
court may limit the anecdotal evidence as it deems appropriate.”47 In effect the ability of 
the defendant to make its defenses on liability in each case may be effectively 
compromised in order to allow the class action proceed as such.  
In principle, it looks as though a systematic inability to present relevant evidence 
against a claim counts as a denial of the right to a full and fair trial, and thus brings into 
question whether the class action model as applied here comports with the requirements 
of procedural due process. Judge Walker is indeed concerned with this issue, but only 
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with respect to absentee members of the class. But here of course he comes up with the 
neat two-step argument that solves their problem quite neatly. First he writes:  
Where class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought in a (b)(2) class 
action for an alleged group harm, there is a presumption of cohesion and unity 
between absent class members and the class representatives such that adequate 
representation will generally safeguard absent class members’ interests and 
thereby satisfy the strictures of due process.48 
This assumption might not hold throughout the trial, so a second adjustment is 
made as well:  
[A]ny due process risk posed by (b)(2) class certification of a claim for 
non-incidental damages can be eliminated by the district court simply affording 
notice and opt out rights to absent class members for those portions of the 
proceedings where the presumption of class cohesion falters--i.e., the damages 
phase of the proceedings.49 
At this point it seems that individual plaintiffs receive handsome compensation 
for the loss of individual control over cases. They are cut out at the first stage of the case, 
where the simplification in liability rules cuts to their advantage. Then they are allowed 
back in the second stage of the case when the damage issues are on the table. It seems 
quite clear that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to raise due process objections against 
rules that are heavily rigged in their favor. But this ostensible cure for one set of due 
process concerns should sound the alarm that a second set has taken place: the defendants 
cannot respond in full to the charges raised against them because of their inability to raise 
their defenses to liability. The fiction that the injunctive relief is common, when the 
position of class members is not, warps the liability phase of the trial beyond all 
recognition. The upshot is that the new legal regime created by the class action rules 
gives the plaintiff lawyers all the tools it needs to bludgeon the defendants into 
submission on a disparate impact claim that is far, far weaker than anything contemplated 
under the original Griggs decision. The procedural tail has wagged the substantive dog. 
The aggregation of claims has resulted in a powerful distortion of the substantive law in 
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ways that systematically favor plaintiffs over defendants in contradiction to the basic 
model that should govern these cases.  
Conclusion.  
Face it, the class action is here to stay. And so it should, for there no question that 
in some contexts it allows plaintiffs with sound but small substantive claims to gain 
access to the courthouse that would be denied to them without some method of 
amalgamation. The class action offers the key for taking the disorganized business of life 
and structuring it in simplified ways that permit mass adjudication. How could anyone 
such as myself, who authored a book entitled “Simple Rules for a Complex World”, be 
opposed to that development? Yet there is more than one way in which the issue on 
simplification goes to the heart of the current disputes over the propriety of class actions. 
A generation ago no one would have doubted that any individual tort, antitrust tie-in or 
employment case was a complex matter under the applicable substantive law. Often these 
cases were decided on grounds that I regarded as improper. In my view, for example, the 
multiple factor tests used in product liability cases are far inferior to a simple common 
law rule that asks whether a latent defect of the defendant’s product caused harm to the 
plaintiff while in its original condition.50 If this substantive view had prevailed, we would 
not have to worry about class action in tobacco cases, because the generic risks of 
tobacco are so well-known that they would be routinely barred, as they indeed were 
under the natural reading of comment i to Section 402A of the Second Restatement of 
Torts.51 Likewise, I think that for the most part the antitrust laws should concern itself in 
dealing with horizontal price-fixing arrangements and mergers, so that exotic tie-in 
theories with treble damage actions would become a thing of the past. Finally, I would do 
away with the disparate impact theory of liability in employment discrimination cases in 
their entirety.  
In dealing with the soundness of class actions, however, it will not do to complain 
about the substantive law as it has been developed in Congress, state legislatures and the 
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courts introduces unneeded complexity in pursuit of unwise legal ends. As the rest of this 
article has presupposed, throughout the class action debate, we have to treat procedural 
law as adjectival law that presupposes the soundness of the underlying substantive law. 
At this point, it is only because the class action system does not seem to work as planned 
in implementing the underlying substantive law (as in other ways) that we should fear or 
condemn its continued application. It is sometimes argued (as by Samuel Issacharoff at 
the class action Conference where this talk was originally presented)52 that the class 
action is really the friend of the conservative/libertarian intellectual in that effective 
enforcement of class actions reduces the need for direct government regulation that 
conservatives and libertarians view with such suspicion. But that criticism misfires in this 
context for several reasons. First, it forces us to interject our views of substantive law into 
the separate question of whether, and if so how, the class action is an effective means of 
enforcement for existing legal rights, whatever these may be. But even if we put that 
caveat aside, the class action does not neatly line itself up with the dispute between 
regulation and private ordering. The class action is a boon to private contract when it 
permits large numbers of individuals to gain refunds of small refunds to which they are 
entitled under contract. It is also a boon when it allows property holders to recover 
damages for the wrongful conversion of their property.53 But by the dynamics of the case 
do not change if the overcharge constitutes a regulatory and not a contractual violation. 
All that happens is that the class action switches side, just as it does when it is used to 
enforce zoning ordinances against property owners.  
Indeed, even if we confine our attention to situations of direct government 
intervention, it hardly follows that ordinary private litigation is preferable to direct 
government regulation. In the product liability area, for example, I have long taken the 
view that the state should prescribe in advance the standard warnings that it wishes to 
impose on certain generic products, and to allow private damage actions only in the 
unlikely event that manufacturers deviate from those warnings. That one simple rule 
would eliminate huge amounts of litigation over the adequacy of warnings, whether on 
cigarettes or prescription drugs. The lawyers, both for plaintiffs and defendants only earn 
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their keep under a legal environment that maximizes the level of legal uncertainty on the 
dubious ground that these mandated warnings are always less stringent than appropriate. 
In these cases I have no doubt that a direct administrative action trumps a class action by 
leaps and bounds. The point is made clear, I think, by looking again at some of the 
disputes that have spawned class actions, where it seems clear that the class action could 
easily prove to be the odd man out. In many cases, the appropriate response is to use 
some combination of administrative action and ordinary private lawsuits to deal with the 
questions at hand. The administrators can fix the defect in line with the substantive 
objectives of these statutes, while the private actions could allow for redress for those 
wrongs that are large enough and clear enough to merit such treatment. Individuals need 
not go it alone, moreover, because it is possible to use permissive joinder techniques to 
permit the amalgamation of suits—although even here the courts should be aware of the 
risks that aggregation of individual cases leads to an unjustified distortion of the 
substantive law.  
To see how all this would work, it is useful to think back to some of the cases 
already discussed. In Basic v. Levinson, the simple remedy for misrepresentation of the 
status of ongoing merger talks is a fine and not a class action. It is doubtful that many 
traders suffered large systematic losses from the misrepresentations, but individual suits 
are available if they did. The massive litigation between Wal-Mart and Visa recasts into 
class form a dispute that should be resolved by a simple administrative order of the 
Federal Trade Commission on the relative interchange prices for debit and credit cards, 
coupled with a fine to deal with the matter. Some large retailers might still choose to 
bring private antitrust actions, but these are likely to be for millions not billions of 
dollars. Most people would just let the matter rest. Likewise in Caridad, the EEOC could 
order some modest changes in Metro-North’s hiring practices if it found that they 
contained some latent defect. The administrative remedy in some cases could prove 
superior to the class action because it could take into account technological or business 
changes that occur after the date of the alleged wrong to members of the class. Most of 
the individual members of the class would have no occasion to sue because they were not 
prejudiced by any of the promotion or discipline problems under challenge. Finally, the 
recalls in Bridgestone/Firestone could easily be handled by administrative action and 
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fine, coupled with tort actions for the individual harms that do take place and a general 
return policy for what is left of the useful life the tires subject to recall.  
The basic point here is that the class action should be viewed as one of a set of devices to 
deal with the potential set of wrongful acts, both actual and potential. But all too 
often, the stout defenders of the class action write as though only it stands 
between the individual consumer, employee, or trader and oblivion.54 Indeed it 
should be quite evident from the decisions discussed here that it is hard to believe 
that Second and Seventh Circuits are addressing the same set of Federal Rules 
under the same body of applicable Supreme Court precedent: the cultural gulf 
between New York and Chicago could not be clearer. The utter divergence in 
their approaches should remind us, if a reminder is needed, that error always dogs 
the interpretation of any complex body of law. To be sure, the denial of class 
action means that relief does not go necessarily to the parties who are injured. 
And in some cases the deterrence supplied by other methods might prove to be 
less (or more) than ideal. But the class action is also subject to defects in its 
administration that dog its application at every step. Ultimately, the only question 
worth asking here is what mix of these various remedial techniques leads to the 
fewest imperfections. That question cannot be answered authoritatively across the 
board one way or the other. But the real and persistent danger of distortion 
through aggregation counts as one strong mark against the class action in its 
current configuration, one that it lies within the capabilities of the courts to 
correct.  
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simply sought fair compensation, in their lifetimes, for injuries or losses from defective or dangerous 
products.” Id at 3. The rhetorical power of her statement should be evident. But so too its shortcomings. 
Her clients will take what she can provide, and will not be upset with overcompensation for admitted 
wrongs or errors in the system that provides them with relief when none should be forthcoming.  
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